Florida trial courts awarding attorney’s fees must make specific Rowe findings—the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended—or the award will not survive appeal. In Guerin v. Countryside North Community Association, Inc., No. 2D22-2004, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed part of a community association foreclosure judgment for exactly that reason, even though the fee at issue was only $265.02.
Facts
Countryside North Community Association, Inc. obtained a final judgment of foreclosure against Leo John Guerin, Jr. in the County Court for Pinellas County. Guerin appealed. Two defects surfaced in the judgment. First, it awarded $265.02 in attorney’s fees for the Association’s prior counsel without any finding as to counsel’s hourly rate or the hours expended. Second, the total stated in the judgment ($2,790.02) did not match the sum of the components itemized in paragraph 9 of the judgment ($2,734.82).
Issue: Are Rowe Findings Required for Every Fee Award?
Is a final judgment awarding attorney’s fees facially erroneous when it lacks specific findings on the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel—and does that rule apply even to a modest award?
Rule
- Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985): a court awarding attorney’s fees must make specific findings as to the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably expended.
- An order lacking these Rowe findings is fundamentally erroneous on its face. The Second District has repeatedly reversed such awards, citing Harris v. McKinney and R.M.A. v. J.A.S.
- The remedy is reversal of the fee portion of the judgment and remand for the trial court to make the required findings—not reversal of the entire judgment.
Analysis
The Second District’s analysis was brief because the rule is settled. Rowe requires the trial court to state the hourly rate it found reasonable and the number of hours it found reasonably expended. Because the judgment contained neither finding for prior counsel’s $265.02 award, that portion of the judgment was erroneous on its face. Reversal is mandatory in that circumstance unless the trial court has made the specific written Rowe findings, and the size of the award does not change the analysis.
The court also addressed the arithmetic. The judgment recited a total of $2,790.02, but the components listed in paragraph 9 added up to $2,734.82. A judgment whose total does not match its own itemization cannot stand as written, so the court remanded for the trial court to correct the calculation.
The remainder of the foreclosure judgment was affirmed. The Second District affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to make the Rowe findings on the prior-counsel fee award and to correct the calculation error.
Conclusion and Practice Points
Guerin is a reminder for association counsel and trial practitioners alike that Rowe findings are not a formality reserved for large fee awards. Three practice points follow. First, a proposed final judgment should recite the hourly rate, the hours expended, and the reasonableness of each for every fee component—including fees claimed for prior counsel. Second, confirm that the judgment’s total actually foots to its itemized components before it is submitted. Third, for the owner on the receiving end, a fee award that lacks Rowe findings is reversible on the face of the order, which makes it one of the more reliable grounds for partial reversal of an association foreclosure judgment.
Cox Law, PLLC represents community associations and owners in COA/HOA disputes, foreclosure litigation, and attorney’s fee proceedings throughout the Tampa Bay area.
Read the opinion: Guerin v. Countryside North — Opinion 2D22-2004 (PDF). A copy is also attached below.