Facts
In 2011, Marilyn Roseanne Hunt rear-ended James Lightfoot in a car accident. Lightfoot sued Hunt in 2012 for negligence, alleging injuries. Hunt had a $50,000 bodily injury liability insurance policy with State Farm, which provided her defense.
In 2015, Lightfoot served a Proposal for Settlement (PFS) on Hunt demanding $1.3 million in cash, payable within 30 days, in exchange for a full release and dismissal of all claims. Hunt did not accept the PFS.
The case proceeded to trial in 2019. The jury found Hunt 100% at fault and awarded Lightfoot more than $11 million in damages (including $10 million in non-economic damages). The underlying judgment was affirmed on appeal.
Lightfoot then moved for attorney’s fees and costs under Florida’s offer of judgment statute (section 768.79, Florida Statutes) and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. The trial court awarded Lightfoot $1,415,254.55 in fees and costs against Hunt and joined State Farm in the judgment. Hunt challenged the award, arguing the PFS was invalid because it was not made in good faith (it imposed an impossible condition). The trial court rejected that argument.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees and costs based on the PFS, specifically whether the PFS was made in good faith under section 768.79(7)(a) and Rule 1.442(h)(1), given that it required payment of $1.3 million in cash within 30 days—an amount and timeframe Hunt (and most individuals) could not realistically meet.
(A secondary procedural issue involved State Farm’s joinder and coverage for the fee judgment, which became moot.)
Rule
- Section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 allow a plaintiff to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees if a valid PFS is not accepted and the plaintiff obtains a judgment at least 25% greater than the offer.
- These provisions are penal in nature and in derogation of the common-law “American Rule” (each party bears its own fees), so they must be strictly construed in favor of the party against whom fees are sought.
- A proposal is not valid for fee-shifting purposes if it was not made in good faith. Good faith requires that the offeror had a reasonable foundation for the offer and made it with a genuine intent to settle the claim if accepted (citing TGI Friday’s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995)).
- The offeree bears the burden of proving lack of good faith. The statute’s purpose is to encourage settlement by sanctioning the unreasonable rejection of realistic offers—not to impose penalties for rejecting illusory ones.
- A trial court’s good-faith determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Application (Analysis)
The 1st DCA held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the PFS was made in good faith.
The court acknowledged that a defendant’s ability to pay is generally irrelevant to PFS validity. However, the specific terms here—demanding $1.3 million in cash within 30 days—created an impossible condition for acceptance. Very few people (including Hunt, who had only $50,000 in insurance coverage) could liquidate and tender that amount in cash so quickly. The offer was therefore illusory: it appeared structured to fail rather than to provide a genuine opportunity to settle.
The court emphasized: “By requiring Ms. Hunt to tender $1.3 million in cash within thirty days to accept, Mr. Lightfoot chose to include an impossible condition that was designed to fail.” This lacked the required intent to settle if accepted and undermined the statute’s purpose of promoting reasonable settlements.
The court noted that alternative wording (e.g., allowing acceptance via entry of judgment or a promissory note) could have made the offer enforceable, but the strict “cash on the barrelhead” demand rendered it invalid for fee-shifting purposes.
Because the PFS was not made in good faith, Lightfoot was not entitled to the substantial attorney’s fee award.
Conclusion (Holding)
The 1st DCA reversed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees, affirmed the award of taxable costs (which was unchallenged), and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
In the companion appeal by State Farm, the court dismissed the appeal as moot once the fee award was reversed.
This decision serves as important precedent that PFS demands must reflect a realistic intent to settle; offers with impossible conditions will not trigger fee sanctions under Florida’s offer of judgment statute
The link may be found here: https://flcourts-media.flcourts.gov/content/download/838684/opinion/Opinion_2020-2303.pdf