The First District Court of Appeal reversed a million-dollar slip-and-fall verdict that had been entered in favor of the Plaintiff, finding that the Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of a foreign substance consistent with the transitory foreign substance statute. See Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1).
Trial Court Activity & Facts
Plaintiff fell in front of the nurses’ station, fracturing her kneecap. Plaintiff alleged the floor was wet. At trial, the Defendant hospital moved for a directed verdict, arguing that Plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence of a wet floor, or that the Medical Center knew of such a substance on the floor, for the case to go to the jury. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury awarded a million-dollar-plus verdict for past and future damages. The Defendant appealed.
Appellate Review & Analysis of the Record
The First DCA noted that premises liability matters governed by the transitory foreign substance statute require the Plaintiff to prove either actual or constructive knowledge. Plaintiff did not appear to present direct evidence of notice, and thus the case turned on the constructive knowledge prong, which involved circumstantial evidence.
“felt like something wet was there, but she did not see a wet substance on the floor before or after her fall.” Indeed, no one saw the wet substance that Plaintiff alleged caused her to fall. Plaintiff testified that the back of her clothes were wet, but she did not know what caused the wetness.
Plaintiff relied on video evidence from a fourth-floor Medical Center camera showing moment-by-moment action in the hallway where she fell. The video does not show a substance on the floor. The video demonstrated, however, employees moving trash bags, linen bags, and trays into the utility room next to where Plaintiff fell, and a housekeeping cart that was wheeled over the spot where Plaintiff fell. Plaintiff asserted that a spill could have resulted from a leaking bag that was dragged to the utility room, from a spilled tray, or from something dropping onto the floor from the housekeeping cart — despite the video not showing any such leaks.
Under section 768.0755, a plaintiff may establish constructive knowledge with circumstantial evidence showing either that the dangerous condition existed for a length of time such that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the business should have known of it, or that the condition occurred with regularity and was therefore foreseeable. Here, the plaintiff offered neither a proven duration nor a recurring pattern, leaving the jury to speculate about whether any substance existed at all.
Stacking of Inferences
The appellate court found that “Plaintiffs may not stack inferences upon a debatable inference drawn from circumstantial evidence.” Plaintiff could not rely upon circumstantial evidence to establish a fact unless it did so to the “exclusion of all other reasonable inferences,” and thus could not further stack additional inferences upon it to establish causation.
The DCA noted that this was not an instance where the main inference underlying the Plaintiff’s case — i.e., that Plaintiff slipped on a wet spot caused by the Defendant — could be established to the exclusion of other reasonable inferences. Indeed, it is just as plausible and reasonable to infer that no liquid was on the floor and that the wetness Plaintiff perceived came from her own flip-flops or clothes after walking into the hospital out of a rainstorm. The additional inferences were likewise improper to stack because each arose from mere speculation, such as whether the bags held liquid or leaked at all.
Thus, the trial court was reversed and a directed verdict was entered in favor of the Defendant.
A link to the opinion may be found here: https://www.1dca.org/content/download/745803/opinion/192437_DC13_060
Key Takeaway for Transitory Foreign Substance Cases
For Florida premises owners, this decision reinforces that a plaintiff proceeding under the transitory foreign substance statute, section 768.0755, must prove that the business had actual or constructive knowledge of the specific substance that caused the fall. Where the existence of a dangerous substance rests on stacked inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence — rather than proof to the exclusion of every other reasonable explanation — a directed verdict is appropriate. Plaintiffs must connect the fall to identifiable evidence of a foreign substance and the defendant’s notice of it, not to speculation about what might have happened.